We study procurement bribery utilizing survey data from 11,000 enterprises in 125 countries. About one-third of managers report that firms like theirs bribe to secure a public contract, paying about 8 % of the contract value. Econometric estimations suggest that national governance factors, such as democratic accountability, press freedom, and rule of law, are associated with lower bribery. Larger and foreignowned firms are less likely to bribe than smaller domestic ones. But among bribers, foreign and domestic firms pay similar amounts. Multinational firms appear sensitive to reputational risks in their home countries, but partially adapt to their host country environments.
aggregate GDP) and $816 billion (about 15 % of GDP) for non-OECD countries. 1 More recent figures for the OECD estimate average public procurement to be approximately $5.45 trillion (about 12 % of aggregate GDP). 2 With projects that range from defense contracts to large public works, the use, abuse, and allocation of these government resources can have a major impact on economic, political and social outcomes.
Media reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that in environments characterized by a lack of transparency and high monitoring costs, bribery is commonplace and often plays a critical role in determining which firm wins a public contract and how contracts are executed. Bribes or "kickbacks" often represent a sizeable percentage of the total contract value in public procurement projects; estimates by the OECD suggest that bribes can represent between 5 and 25 % of the total contract value in international business transactions (Bribery in Public Procurement 2007) . Despite the enhanced general awareness and concern about the prevalence and cost of procurement bribery over the last decade or so, there is no evidence of a general decline in procurement bribery around the globe, and there is a lack of consensus as to which reforms and measures are effective. This is in part due to the paucity of empirical research on procurement bribery.
Building upon a simple conceptual framework, this paper exploits a large enterprise survey of over 11,000 firms operating in 125 countries to explore empirically key factors related to the incidence and magnitude of public procurement bribery. 3 In the framework, the firm is a profit-maximizer that makes decisions on whether or not to bribe based on its cost-benefit calculations linked to profits. We hypothesize that these benefits and costs differ across firms and across countries, based on the country's quality of governance, among other factors. We also suggest that for many firms, the actual direct financial outlay for a bribe may be a relatively minor component in the total cost-benefit calculations. In other words, the potential reputational costs of bribery detection, and/or the actual penalties from possible prosecution, may feature as more important components on the cost side of bribery. We utilize a quantitative survey variable on procurement bribery to gauge whether firms like the ones surveyed are engaged in bribing and if so, the size of the bribe fee paid (as a percentage of contract value). To our knowledge, there have not been prior papers that analyze econometrically the factors associated with procurement bribery based on a cross-country survey of firms.
The data reveal that a large proportion of managers across the globe admit that "firms like theirs" pay illicit payments in order to secure government contracts. On average, approximately 32 % of managers report that firms like theirs bribe to secure a government contract; this percentage ranges from 13 % of firms based in highincome OECD countries to 32 % in middle-income countries and 50 % in low-income 1 The Size of Government Procurement Markets (2002, p. 8) . Estimates are from 1997 and 1998. 2 Size of Public Procurement Market (2011, p. 148) . Percentage of GDP estimates are from 2008. Authors' calculation of dollar amount is based on 2012 GDP for OECD member states, available at http://stats.oecd. org. 3 The survey data were generously provided by the World Economic Forum from their Executive Opinion Survey 2006. countries. This underscores the fact that while the incidence of bribery does vary across countries, such corrupt behavior is not limited to poorer developing countries.
Bribery can occur at several stages during the procurement process, such as during the feasibility study, during tendering, or when determining bid eligibility; in assessing and awarding the bid; during project implementation; and/or in re-contracting. Such corruption may result in unnecessary or inefficient projects; furthermore, it can distort the overall structure of government expenditures if officials skew the allocation of resources toward sectors in which graft is more lucrative and/or less prone to detection, for example, from social services to defense (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 2000) .
This work contributes to a growing number of firm-level studies on corruption, as well as several theoretical contributions examining procurement bribery. A number of previous empirical studies are based on a single or limited number of countries and examine general bribery or corruption rather than the specific determinants of bribery in procurement (Fisman and Svensson 2007; Hellman et al. 2000; Svensson 2003) . Other works focus on the impact of corruption-as part of the overall business climate-on firm growth and investment (Beck et al. 2005; Batra et al. 2003) . Our work provides a different perspective-examining one specific form of bribery using a worldwide firm-level dataset. And our work complements several theoretical pieces highlight the potential role of corruption during the procurement process (Auriol 2006; Celentani and Ganuza 2002) . The next section presents the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the results and robustness checks. And Sect. 5 concludes.
Conceptual framework
In this section we present a simple framework to guide the selection of independent variables and the interpretation of the results. Firms are profit-maximizing agents who can choose to specialize in efficiency or in rent-seeking when engaging in public contracting. A firm chooses whether to bribe (and how much to bribe) based on the expected profits with and without bribery-consistent with models of crime and punishment, principal agent, and rent-seeking. These models posit that an economic agent will engage in an illegal activity if the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs (Becker 1968; Becker and Stigler 1974; Murphy et al. 1991) .
A firm's profit equals the contract revenues minus the costs of tendering the bid and implementing the contract. On the revenue side, expected profits incorporate the probability of winning a contract, which-in some countries-is a function of paying a bribe. On the cost side, expected profits incorporate the probability of being caught and convicted of bribery, contingent on bribing. The cost of bribery far exceeds the actual bribe fee; it also includes transaction costs, and-if detected and prosecutedfines, penalties, incarceration, loss of reputation, loss of market access, and foregone sales.
A firm will choose to bribe if: (i) the expected profit with bribery is larger than the expected profit without bribery, and (ii) the expected profit with bribery is positive. If only (i) holds, then the firm does not tender the bid. If only (ii) holds, then the firm tenders the bid without bribing. The benefits and costs associated with bribery depend on firm characteristics and the environment (Hallward-Driemeier and Reyes 2009). The national quality of governance can influence a firm's cost-benefit calculus through several channels. We expect that in environments with better governance, broadly defined, there is a higher probability of detection and conviction (and thus of a reputational loss) resulting in a larger cost of bribery. We also expect that better governance reduces the potential to earn supra-normal monopolistic rents, reducing the profit from a contract to one which is consistent with competitive 'normal' profits. And we expect that in environments with poor governance, there is a higher probability of winning a contract if a firm bribes.
We focus on five related, but distinct dimensions of governance: transparency; freedom of press; voice and accountability; rule of law; and government effectiveness. The first three relate to (citizen) demand driven aspects of governance, 4 whereas the last two relate to (public sector) supply driven aspects. Transparency, freedom of press, and voice and accountability directly affect the detection of malfeasance, whereas strong rule of law, including well-functioning courts and police, directly affects the likelihood of enforcement and the penalties associated with the legal and judicial process when corruption is investigated. Government effectiveness relates to the functioning of the public sector, and its civil service and procurement systems. In countries where these public sector institutions are effective, the potential benefits to a firm of bribing and winning a contract are smaller, while the potential costs are greater. Therefore, we expect to find negative relationships between these national indicators of governance and our firm measures of procurement bribery.
Further, more competition between firms should reduce both expected profits and the probability of winning a contract with bribery. The sign of the effect of higher levels of competition on the probability of winning a contract without bribery is unknown and will depend on the firm's efficiency, among other characteristics, vis-à-vis its competitors. Therefore, the expected sign on the measure of competition is ambiguous.
Given the better general governance environment in OECD countries, and possibly also due to cross-national legal covenants such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, it would be expected that firms based in these countries would report less bribery, since they face higher expected costs of bribery stemming from large penalties and reputational risks, as well as a higher probability of detection and conviction, relative to firms based in non-OECD countries. 5 At the firm level, we test the signs of three main attributes-firm size, foreign or domestic ownership, and location of headquarters (OECD, non-OECD). 6 Firms of 4 Demand-driven governance is a term often used by international donor agencies to describe the institutions of, and initiatives for, accountability and transparency originating outside of the public sector, i.e., driven by citizens, civil society, and the private sector. By contrast, supply-driven governance refers to those institutions and initiatives led by the government. 5 The OECD Convention created large penalties for firms and individuals caught bribing a foreign public official. Until the advent of the OECD Convention, bribing a foreign public official was only illegal for US firms (following the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). In all countries, bribing a domestic public official had been illegal for some time. 6 Firm attributes are taken as exogenous. different sizes face different perceived costs and benefits associated with bribery due, for example, to varying degrees of political and economic power. While there may be circumstances under which a large firm derives a particularly large benefit from bribing for a contract (e.g., by obtaining monopoly rights), large firms in general may have more alternatives to bribery available to them than small firms (e.g., using political clout or offering employment opportunities to family members of public officials). With less bargaining power and fewer substitutes to bribery, smaller firms may have more incentive to bribe and may be more susceptible to the grabbing hand of the state (Shleifer and Vishny 1998) .
Furthermore, large firms are more visible and so the probability of detection is greater than that of small firms. Large firms may have more to lose in terms of reputational costs and in terms of foregone sales and penalties, increasing their expected costs of bribery and decreasing their expected profits from bribery. On balance, therefore, a priori it can be expected that smaller firms are more likely to bribe.
Foreign and domestic firms may exhibit different bribery behavior as well. Foreign firms may have larger expected costs of bribing given greater reputational risk (e.g., their business dealings in one country may affect their business throughout the world) and higher transaction costs (as they are generally less politically wellconnected than domestic firms). Foreign firms may also be more likely to be detected since they are often more visible than domestic firms and have fewer contacts who can help conceal bribery. Foreign firms have more bargaining power vis-à-vis public officials because they have more entry and exit options, including simply choosing not to operate in a country. They have better access to markets and resources abroad and tend to enjoy political backing from their home governments in their operations abroad, including mustering the political support of their embassies in the host country to obtain contracts. On average, these factors decrease the marginal expected profits of bidding with a bribe for a foreign firm, as compared with domestic firms.
Ownership characteristics of a foreign firm may matter in its decision to bribe. Subsidiaries that are headquartered abroad may be more closely tied to their home country, whereas joint ventures with local headquarters may have closer ties with domestic partners. The latter may engage closely with local partners to exploit local connections and face higher exit costs (to operate in other countries); further they may incur lower transaction and reputational costs associated with bribery given their local connections. Such circumstances would result in higher expected profits with bribery, and thus we expect joint ventures to have a higher expected propensity to bribe as compared with fully-owned subsidiaries.
Data and estimation

Enterprise survey data
Our primary data are from the 2006 Executive Opinion Survey-a survey of 11,232 business managers in 125 countries-conducted by the World Economic Forum (WEF). The annual survey forms the basis of the Global Competitiveness Report, which monitors critical components of competitiveness in economies throughout the world. The 2006 survey consists of 146 questions. There are 14 questions related to corruption, which are interspersed throughout the survey and begin only after basic questions about the firm and the economy have been asked in order to make the respondent comfortable. The data allow us to compare reports of bribery across firms within the same country, as well as across countries.
A critical concern when using survey data related to corruption is whether respondents answer candidly. For this reason, the survey uses indirect questioning to mitigate issues of underreporting; for example, phrasing like "firms like yours" or "firms in your industry" is used rather than directly asking about the respondent's firm. Also, since the WEF ensures full anonymity to the respondent manager and presents the survey as a tool to assess a country's competitiveness and business environmentwithout undue focus on corruption-managers may be more apt to respond honestly. It is thus reasonable to assume that the response of a firm is highly correlated with its actual bribery experience.
In each country the WEF employed partner organizations to collect the data. The survey solicits the opinions and experiences of entrepreneurs and managers rather than business experts who may be unfamiliar with daily firm operations. Wherever feasible at least some of the following firms were sampled: domestic firms that sell in foreign markets; units of foreign firms that operate in the domestic market; and firms with significant government ownership. Generally, there was a tendency to oversample executives in international firms, even though domestic companies still constitute the vast majority of the sample in every country. A major shortcoming of the survey is that the samples of firms are not representative at the national levels, so the country averages derived from this survey may not necessarily be extrapolated to accurately reflect actual national averages.
Bribery measures
We exploit a survey question that provides a quantitative measure of the magnitude of procurement bribes paid to create two measures of bribery. The question asks, "When firms like yours do business with the government, how much (% fee) of the contract value are they expected to pay in 'additional payments' for the bid to succeed?". Possible responses are as follows: 0; bribery less than 2 % of the contract fee; 2-5, 5-10, and 10-20 %; more than 20 %; and Do Not Know/N.A.
We construct a categorical variable (labeled "bribe fee paid") that includes all responses except "do not know/NA"; we recoded responses to the midpoint of the range, except in the highest category: 0, 1, 3.5, 7.5, 15 and 20 %. We also construct a dummy variable (labeled "bribery dummy") that takes a value of one if a respondent reports paying a positive bribe fee, and zero otherwise. 7 Approximately 32 % of firms report that firms like theirs bribe in procurement, and on average these firms pay bribes amounting to about 8 % of the contract value ( Table 1 ). The raw data show that domestic firms report more bribery than joint ventures or subsidiaries. And, with the exception of the largest firms, smaller firms report more bribery than larger firms. The raw data are also suggestive of the notion that firms adapt their behavior to the environment in which they operate. Firms from OECD countries behave differently when operating at home, when operating abroad in developed countries, and when operating abroad in developing countries (Table 2) . About 11 % of OECD multinationals that operate in another OECD country report paying a bribe; in contrast, 26 % of OECD subsidiaries operating in low-income countries report paying a bribe. About 14 % of domestic firms operating in high-income OECD countries report paying a bribe. Similarly, non-OECD based firms report substantially less procurement bribery when doing business in high-income OECD countries (21 % report bribery) than when doing business in low-income countries (50 % report bribery). About 55 % of domestic firms operating in low-income countries report paying a bribe. The patterns suggest that firm behavior is influenced by both host country and home country factors.
Footnote 7 continued from managers who want to conceal bribery or who simply do not know if bribes are being paid within the firm. Kaufmann et al. (2008) : rule of law (RL); voice and accountability (VA); and government effectiveness (GE). RL measures "The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence". VA measures "The extent to which country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media". GE measures "perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies" (Kaufmann et al. 2008, p.10) . We use the Freedom House Indicators (2008) on press freedom, which categorizes countries into "Free", "Partly Free" or "Not Free" based on the extent to which politics, economics and the legal environment influence access to information and dissemination of news. We also use an indicator on transparency created by Kaufmann and Bellver (2005) .
As a proxy for competition, we use the regulatory quality indicator from WGI; it measures "The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development" and thus foster competition (Kaufmann et al. 2008, p. 10) . We use GDP, population, and land area as measures of country size in robustness tests and per capita GDP (in purchasing power parity) as a measure of development (World Bank World Development Indicators Database 2008). Size is broken down into eight categories and refers to the number of employees within the operating country where the survey takes places. 9 Approximately 31 % of firms have <50 employees; and 41 % have between 50 and 500 employees.
About 29 % of the respondent firms have significant foreign private ownership (denoted as foreign), indicating a minimum 10 % foreign direct investment (a conventional cutoff). (About 22 % of all firms have over 50 % FDI.) Just over one-half of foreign firms have local headquarters; the rest are headquartered abroad. The former are more likely to be part of joint ventures, in which the local counterpart retains substantial authority. The latter are more likely to be controlled subsidiaries of multinationals. Of the firms that are headquartered abroad, 84 % are headquartered in OECD countries.
Estimation
We use a probit model to estimate the correlates of the incidence of procurement bribery. The model is as follows:
where y i j is the bribery dummy which equals unity for firm i in country j if it reports a positive fee paid to obtain a contract. corresponds to the cumulative normal distribution function. f is a vector of firm characteristics, including dummy variables for firm size; and dummies for foreign firm characteristics. 10 g is a vector of governance variables, including transparency, rule of law, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and indicators of free press and partly free press. 11 c is the proxy for competition.
Public procurement bribery may depend on the system of procurement utilized, e.g., type of auctions and contract restrictions, which may vary across countries and across industries. We control for such unobserved heterogeneity across industries by including industry dummies in all regressions. The survey uses the Dow Jones Industrial classification: oil and gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, healthcare, consumer services, telecommunications, utilities, financials, technology, and other. In the robustness tests, we also include country dummies to account for possible differences in procurement systems across countries, as well as other unobservable factors.
The probit model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. HubertWhite standard errors are clustered at the country level, allowing for heteroscedasticity and correlation in the error terms of firms within the same country. The regressions for the magnitude of procurement bribery use an OLS estimator with the same independent variables described above. 12 Our econometric estimations are limited by the cross-sectional nature of the data. In contrast to models employing panel data, we are unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity among firms, among other potential factors that may bias the results. Further, given the complex relationship between levels of corruption, development and governance, there are challenges of endogeneity (e.g., reverse causality and omitted variable bias) that cannot be ignored. We therefore devote a separate Sect. 4.3 of the paper to a discussion of these limitations and a presentation of empirical tests that address some of these critical issues.
Results
This subsection summarizes the key findings; the following two subsections provide detailed descriptions of the results on the country-level correlates of bribery and the firm-level correlates of bribery. Finally we discuss the robustness of the results, including empirical tests that address some potential biases resulting from the cross-sectional nature of the data and the fundamental interconnectedness of corruption, development and governance.
Consistent with the simple conceptual framework presented above, we find strong, statistically significant relationships between the demand-and supply-driven dimensions of governance, as well as competition, on the one hand, and the incidence of public procurement bribery for all firms, on the other. These relationships are robust to the inclusion of log GDP per capita-as a proxy measure of the country's level of development (for details, see Sect. 4.3).
The bribery behavior of multinationals operating abroad is influenced by levels of demand-driven governance in both the host and home countries, and levels of supplydriven governance in the host country. For these firms, the results suggest that the risk of exposure may be more important than enforcement and penalties per se. We also find that the incidence of bribery is strongly associated with firm characteristics, particularly firm size and location of headquarters, and that the firm-level results are robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects.
Among firms that report bribing, differences in the magnitude of the bribe fees paid seem to be driven by national governance quality. Similarly, in the case of multinational firms, governance quality in the host country is significantly associated with the bribe fee offered. In contrast, the characteristics of the home country where the firm's headquarters are located do not seem to be important factors in explaining the bribe fee paid; i.e., ceteris paribus, domestic and foreign firms tend to bribe in similar amounts.
Country-level factors
Consistent with the simple cost-benefit framework, we find a lower conditional likelihood of bribery in countries with strong, transparent political and economic institutions that ensure citizen voice, reinforce the rule of law, and foster competition. Tables 4  and 5 display the marginal effects-or the percentage point change in the probability of bribing-of each independent variable, evaluated at the sample means; the dependent variable is the bribery dummy.
We find strong evidence that competition and the five main dimensions of the governance-transparency, press freedom, voice and accountability, rule of law, and government effectiveness-are significantly associated with a lower incidence of procurement bribery after controlling for firm characteristics. 13 Across specifications, Marginal effects from Probit regressions are evaluated at the sample means. Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors-in brackets-are clustered by country. The dependent variable is an indicator for bribes paid. 0-50 employees is excluded size category. Regressions include industry dummies and a dummy for government ownership *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively these variables are statistically significant and economically meaningful. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the level of voice and accountability is associated with a 13 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of bribing. Further, we find that firms based in OECD countries are about 12 percentage points less likely to bribe than their domestic counterparts operating in the same country.
Next we turn to how governance factors affect the magnitude of bribe fees paid. Tables 6 (only firm characteristics) and 7 (adding governance dimensions and competition) display the coefficients and robust standard errors from OLS estimation of the bribe fee paid. Country-level factors seem to be more important than firm-level Footnote 13 continued does not detract from the evidence we find on illegal bribery, it places the results in context and underscores the fact that procurement bribery is but one among a number of important dimensions of corruption. Marginal effects from Probit regressions are evaluated at the sample means. Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors-in brackets-are clustered by country. The dependent variable is an indicator for bribes paid. 0-50 employees is excluded size category. Regressions include industry dummies and a dummy for government ownership *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively 3.5, 7.5, 15, and 20 . 0-50 employees is excluded size category. All regressions include industry dummies and a dummy for government ownership *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively factors. In fact, we see no difference in bribe fees paid by foreign or domestic firms, nor differences based on the location of a firm's headquarters. Thus, the evidence suggests that while both country conditions and firm characteristics influence the decision to bribe, country conditions play a more important role in determining the bribe fee once the decision to bribe has been made. In a firm's costbenefit calculus of whether or not to bribe, its own characteristics, which determine its outside options, will influence its decision. However, once the firm has decided to bribe and begins negotiations with the public official regarding the amount to be paid, then the firm may have less control. Public officials in more corrupt, poorly governed environments may be better able to extract rents from firms. Furthermore, in terms of reputational risks (e.g., being exposed by the press), paying the bribe is likely to be the risky decision, rather than choosing the amount to pay. Coefficients from OLS regressions. Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errorsin brackets-are clustered by country. The dependent variable is bribe fee paid. The variable takes on values of 1, 3.5, 7.5, 15, and 20. 0-50 employees is excluded size category. All regressions include industry dummies and a dummy for government ownership *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
Firm-level factors
Firm characteristics play a significant role in the incidence of bribery, but a less prominent role determining the magnitude of bribe fees paid. We therefore concentrate our discussion on the results related to the incidence of bribery displayed in Tables 4 and 5 .
We observe three strong patterns, after controlling for country and industry factors. First, smaller firms are more likely to bribe than larger firms. Second, domestic firms are more likely to bribe than foreign firms. And third, firms based in OECD countries are less likely to bribe than those based in non-OECD countries.
Firm size
On average, we observe lower rates of bribery reported by larger firms; in particular, small firms with less than 100 employees are more likely to bribe than medium sized (100-1,000 employees) or large firms (over 1,000 employees). 14 These patterns may reflect either higher expected costs of bribery or lower expected benefits from bribery, or both. 15 Large firms may have more substitutes to bribery than small firms, for example, potential employment opportunities for the official's relatives. Large firms may use political clout or forms of corruption other than procurement bribery, such as state capture-defined as bribes paid by powerful firms to influence policies, laws and regulations. Additionally, through economies of scale, large firms may have an advantage in competing for contracts. Finally since larger firms are more visible in the economy, the probability of being detected is higher than for smaller firms.
Foreign firms
In this section, we examine the behavior of foreign firms (i) relative to their domestic counterparts; (ii) based on the location of their headquarters; and (iii) based on their home country characteristics. The results demonstrate that firms with at least 10 % private foreign ownership are less likely to engage in procurement bribery than their counterparts. 16 As described in the conceptual framework, foreign firms may be less subject to extortion given their clout, exit options and recourse. With greater resources, foreign firms may be at a competitive advantage, reducing the potential gains from bribery. They may have higher transaction costs associated with bribery since they may have fewer political connections. Since they are more visible, foreign firms may perceive a higher likelihood of detection if they engage in bribery, lowering the incentives to bribe. Finally, given the potential implications for their operations in other countries, foreign firms may be less willing to risk their reputations by bribing.
14 In some regressions, the effects for the largest firms (over 20,000 employees) are not significant; this may simply be due to the small number of observations in this category. 15 A caveat to these results is that large firms may be more likely to underreport bribery since they have more to lose-in terms of assets and reputation-than do small firms. Also a firm may underreport bribery if the respondent is unaware of bribes being paid within the firm, which is more likely in a large firm. Such underreporting could be driving partially the coefficients on firm size. 16 As with large firms, foreign firms may be more likely to underreport bribes paid since they have more to lose.
There are 3,215 firms (about 29 % of the sample) with over 10 % foreign private ownership recorded. 17 About half of these firms have local headquarters; the remainder are headquartered abroad. Of those foreign firms that are headquartered abroad, 85 % are based in OECD countries. We observe that joint ventures and subsidiaries are less likely to bribe than domestic firms (the excluded category in the model). Subsidiaries that are headquartered abroad may be more closely tied to their home country, whereas joint ventures with local headquarters may have closer ties with domestic partners. The latter may engage closely with local partners to exploit local knowledge and connections, reducing the transaction costs associated with bribery and reducing the probability of detection-resulting in higher expected profits with bribery, and thus an increased propensity to bribe. Furthermore, the reputational costs associated with bribery are likely to be much larger for global multinationals than for domestic firms.
Of the firms that are headquartered in foreign countries, firms headquartered in OECD countries are the least likely, relative to domestic firms, to report paying a bribe. This result is consistent with our conceptual framework; firms in OECD countries face higher expected costs of bribery stemming from large penalties, a higher probability of detection and conviction, and greater reputational risks than firms based in non-OECD countries.
In order to examine the behavior of foreign firms in more detail, we limit our sample to foreign firms headquartered abroad. Tables 8 and 9 display the results with only firms headquartered abroad for the incidence and magnitude of bribery, respectively. Similar to the full sample results, for firms headquartered abroad the country-level variables influence both measures of bribery, while the firm-level variables play a more prominent role in determining the incidence of bribery.
The quality of governance in the home country may affect a foreign firm's decision to bribe (though we do not discuss this explicitly in the framework section above). 18 Foreign firms can be prosecuted in their home country for bribing abroad, particularly US multinationals due to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and more recently, OECD multinationals following the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention of 1997. Thus, where rule of law in the home country is particularly stringent, foreign companies may be more likely to face high costs from bribing abroad. Further, multinationals may be particularly concerned about the potential reputational fallout in their home country from bribing abroad, in which case the extent of disclosure and voice in the home country may be a determinant of their propensity to bribe abroad. Thus we would expect these foreign firms to be less prone to bribery. On the other hand, home country penalties may not deter significantly bribery behavior abroad if the probability of detection in the host country is low and the probability of exposure at home is low.
We include home country and host country characteristics in order to examine whether standards of governance in the home country directly influence bribery pat- 17 Results are robust to the use of different cut-offs for foreign classification, e.g., 50 %. 18 Since a multinational firm operating abroad would factor both the home and host country conditions in its calculus, one would expect that its propensity to bribe abroad would be different than its propensity to bribe at home. Insofar as governance conditions are stricter, on average, in OECD countries than in developing countries, multinationals based in OECD countries would be expected to bribe more frequently when operating abroad. That is, the same firm would at least in part adapt its behavior to the local environment. Sample includes firms that are HQ abroad only. Marginal effects from Probit regressions are evaluated at the sample means. Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors-in brackets-are clustered by country. The dependent variable is an indicator for bribes paid. 0-50 employees is excluded size category. All regressions include industry dummies and a dummy for government ownership *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively terns of multinational firms. From the perspective of our simple cost-benefit framework where the profit-maximizing firm faces the option to bid with or without a bribe, the multinational firm's probability of being awarded the contract and the probability of detection and potential penalties are in large measure dependent on the host country Sample includes firms that are HQ abroad only. Coefficients from OLS regressions. Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors-in brackets-are clustered by country. The dependent variable is bribe fee paid. The variable takes on values of 1, 3.5, 7.5, 15, and 20. 0-50 employees is excluded size category. All regressions include industry dummies and a dummy for government ownership *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1, respectively governance environment. In this respect, the calculation for a multinational is not very different than that of a domestic firm, except that a multinational has more exit and 'influence' alternatives, and, as noted, also needs to factor in home country governance factors. Sample includes firms that are HQ abroad only. Marginal effects from Probit regressions are evaluated at the sample means. Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors-in brackets-are clustered by country. The dependent variable is an indicator for bribes paid. All regressions include firm size dummies, industry dummies, and a dummy for government ownership *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
Home country transparency is statistically significant and is associated with a reduction in the incidence of procurement bribery (Table 10) . Home country voice and accountability is of similar magnitude and nearly statistically significant at 10 %. This is consistent with a story in which the likelihood of being exposed at home for foreign bribery and the associated loss in reputation act as partial deterrents to bribery abroad. Home country rule of law is not statistically significant. This may suggest that global firms fear more the reputational loss than an eventual (low probability) conviction in their home country. 19 Competition in the home country is also not statistically significant, suggesting that the importance of competition is limited to the actual host country environment in which the firm operates. This finding may have been expected since any potential supra-normal profits would be earned within that host country operating environment, and not in the home country.
None of the coefficients on the home governance indicators are statistically significant in the bribe fee regressions, but those on the host country governance indicators are significant and larger in magnitude than the analogous results for the full sample of firms (Table 11) .
In summary, a firm's decision to engage in procurement bribery is partly associated with governance-namely, transparency, consistent with reputational risk-in its home country, but it is influenced more broadly by a range of institutional and governance realities in the host country.
Caveats to the results and robustness tests
There are several caveats to be kept in mind when interpreting the results above. First, as in any cross-sectional analysis, there is the potential for omitted firm-or country-level variables to bias the estimates. 20 Second, there could be possible feedback (through reverse causality) between the measures of bribery and the indicators of governance. In this section, we first address sources of omitted variable bias by running a series of robustness tests; while not fully conclusive, the outcomes of the tests suggest that the main empirical results are consistent with the cost-benefit framework depicted above. We then discuss the issue of reverse causality. Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative measures of governance and competition.
At the firm level, we explore several issues related to how managers respond to survey questions and how managers see the world. Such attitudes or preferences could be unobserved omitted variables that are correlated with other firm characteristics; therefore we test proxies for such unobservable factors. First, we test for a possible 'halo' effect, as related to (i) managers whose firms are performing well, or (ii) managers who believe the country's economic prospects are strong; these managers may respond in a systematically different (more positive) way to questions on graft. To 3.5, 7.5, 15, and 20 . All regressions include firm size dummies, industry dummies, and a dummy for government ownership *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively test case (i), we include the firm's average annual percentage change in production over the past three years as an additional control. The results show little association between firm growth and the probability of reporting bribery. Further, there is little or no change in the point estimates of the main variables of interest after inclusion of this control variable. To test case (ii), we include as a control a question on the economic prospects of the country. To mitigate potential firm-specific perception effects and, to an extent, omitted variable bias due to the same firm managers answering questions on bribery and country performance, we aggregate the responses to the country level.
The main results are qualitatively the same (results not reported, but available upon request).
Next we test for a 'kvetch' 21 effect, which refers to systematic differences across firm respondents (or across countries) in how they see the (same) world (and constraints); this effect may influence systematically the firm's reporting of bribery due to firm-specific differences in their propensity to complain or differences in cultural attitudes. To test whether the results are driven by a general euphoric or depressed outlook by the firm, we use the firm's responses to qualitative questions from the same survey that are not directly related to governance. We test two variables, each aggregated to the country level-one related to labor relations, the other related to hiring and firing regulations. The coefficients are largely insignificant and there is no change in the variables of interest, suggesting that the firm's particular outlook on the overall environment and situation is not driving the results (results not reported, but available upon request).
Related to the above concern, introducing control variables from labor markets such as labor flexibility and relations, which are outside the governance set that we focus on, is also a simple implicit test of the proposition that the association between the governance variables and bribery may merely be a reflection of a correlation that exists between any variable that captures the firm's environment and firm-level bribery. In other words, by introducing these labor-related variables alongside the core governance variables, we have a partial test of the alternative proposition that all environment-relevant variables drive the bribery function. We find that the coefficients of these labor-related variables are small and largely insignificant and that they do not affect the magnitude and significance of our governance variables of interest; this suggests that our findings are not merely by construction and that there is differentiation across different types of constraints faced by the firm in explaining bribery (results not reported, but available upon request).
At the country level, we explore the potential roles of economic development and education in contributing to procurement bribery. It is possible that the governance estimates are being driven by some omitted factors in the development process that are unrelated to the role of governance; thus we add the log of GDP per capita to the main regressions as a proxy for the level of development. Insofar as governance has a causal positive effect on a country's level of development, there will be a downward bias in the estimates of the governance coefficients when introducing the GDP per capita variable, since such coefficients would only reflect the partial effect on bribery at a given level of GDP per capita. 22 We observe little change in the governance-related coefficients, though in some cases their magnitudes decrease slightly, as expected (Appendix Table 12 ). The bribe fee results are also robust to adding log GDP per capita (Appendix Table 13 ).
There is evidence that areas with a more educated population may have less bribery (Glaeser and Saks 2006) and education levels may be correlated with demand-driven governance as well; thus omitting education levels could lead to biased coefficients on some variables of interest. Therefore we include the average years of schooling as an additional variable in the main bribery incidence and bribe fee regressions using data from Barro and Lee (2010) . 23 The main coefficients of interest are qualitatively the same (results not reported, but available upon request). In most cases, the coefficients on years of schooling are not statistically significant; in the bribery incidence regressions, the coefficient is significant (but small) when we include press freedom indicators. 24 As a further test, we include an interaction between average years of schooling and the press freedom variables; the interaction captures the fact that in countries where the population is more educated, a free press may not only expose bribery but may result in strong opposition to bribery. The coefficients on the interaction terms are very small and not statistically significant; and there is no change in the main coefficients of interest (results not reported, but available upon request).
As a more comprehensive test of country-level omitted variables that could be biasing the coefficients on the firm-level factors, we include country fixed effects in the model. This strategy fully controls for any unobservable or observable factors that could bias the results (Appendix Table 14 ). The coefficients on firm size, location of headquarters and ownership are precisely estimated and of similar magnitude to the results above.
While the series of tests above suggest that the main results are, to a large extent, robust, the tests do not address the potential issue of reverse causality (i.e., feedback from the dependent variable to the independent variables). More specifically, it is possible that firm behavior (engaging in procurement bribery)-in the aggregateinfluences country-level factors such as governance or competition. Empirically, we are unable to disentangle the direction of causality (for example, by using an instrumental variable). Therefore the main results must be interpreted with caution; our findings provide evidence of a strong association between firm-level and country-level factors and the incidence and magnitude of procurement bribery, but do not speak to the direction of causality.
Finally we examine whether the results are robust to using alternative measures of the key variables. In the following exercises, we focus on the incidence of bribery (results for the bribe fee are available upon request). To further explore the role of information (such as through press freedom) and transparency, we draw on two questions from the EOS survey. The first relates to media censorship and press freedom; the second relates to the provision of information on government policies and regulations. 25 The results show that both variables (aggregated to the country level)-when included independently in lieu of the other governance measures-are strongly associated with the likelihood of bribing and are of similar magnitude to the transparency and press freedom measures (Appendix Table 15 ). To examine different dimensions of competition, we utilize an EOS survey question on the level of procurement competition that asks managers whether they believe there is a level playing field in public contracting; the survey asks, "When deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials: [1: usually favor well-connected firms and individuals] to [7: are neutral]". The effect of the level of competition is largely robust to this alternative measure (Appendix Table 15 ).
To explore other aspects of government effectiveness, we rerun the regressions with several proxies for challenges to public sector management. In particular, ceteris paribus, we expect that larger countries requiring larger bureaucracies may be more difficult to manage and oversee, and thus it may be more difficult to curtail bribery or to detect and prosecute those who bribe. Comparing the different challenges entailed in governing Singapore and China, or Mauritius and Russia, illustrates. Furthermore in large countries the likelihood of detection when bribing can be expected to be lower than in smaller countries, and therefore the incentives to bribe are expected to be greater in large countries. We use three measures of country size: total GDP, population size, and land area. The empirical results indicate that as country size increases, the probability of bribing increases (Appendix Table 16 ). 26
Conclusion
We utilize a worldwide firm survey to explore empirically the firm and country characteristics associated with public procurement bribery. In contrast to many surveys that include only qualitative questions on general corruption, this survey (from the World Economic Forum) asks about the magnitude of bribes paid in order to secure a government contract, giving us a quantitative measure of bribes paid, as well as an indicator variable for firms that report having ever paid a bribe.
The raw data reveal that 32 % of firms surveyed report a positive bribe fee paid. For domestic firms, this percentage ranges from 13 % for those operating in high-income OECD countries to as high as 55 % for those operating in low-income developing countries. Firms with substantial foreign ownership are, on average, less prone to bribery, though they still report bribing often; 14 % of multinationals headquartered 25 Question on press freedom: "In your country, can the media publish/broadcast stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation? [1: no] to [7: yes-whatever they want]". Question on information: "Are firms in your country usually informed clearly by the government on changes in policies and regulations affecting your industry? [1: never informed] to [7: always informed]". 26 Also log GDP can be seen as a proxy for contract size. Therefore the results are also consistent with a firm-level story of contract size being a determinant of bribery. In particular, we would expect more bribery to occur in larger projects where it may be more difficult to detect bribery and potential rents may be greater.
in OECD countries report bribing, whereas 33 % of multinationals headquartered in non-OECD countries report bribing. The magnitudes of bribe fees paid are also substantial, with firms operating in OECD countries paying about 6 % of the contract value and firms operating in low income countries paying about 9 %. Given the size of government contracts, these numbers are non-trivial. Furthermore, after controlling for other factors, we find no statistically significant difference in bribe fees paid among foreign and domestic firms. Therefore, the overall magnitude of bribes paid may be larger in rich countries than in poor countries; this follows from the fact that the average size of contracts in OECD countries is over 5 times that of non-OECD countries, whereas the reported incidence of bribery by firms operating in non-OECD countries is approximately 2.6 times that of firms operating in OECD countries (The Size of Government Procurement Markets, p. 8).
Empirically, we find strong evidence that national governance in the country where a firm operates plays an important role in determining a firm's decision to bribe and how much it pays. These results suggest that beyond firm-level contract-specific and project-specific characteristics, both the national-level citizen-driven demand side of good governance (voice and accountability, transparency, free press) and the nationallevel public sector institution-driven supply side (government effectiveness, rule of law) appear to be important. For multinationals, governance factors in both the home and host countries play a role in their bribing decisions. But in terms of home country governance, only demand side governance dimensions appear to play a significant role. Both demand and supply side country governance dimensions appear to matter in the host country. This is consistent with the notion that a multinational that bribes abroad may be more concerned with its reputational risk than with prosecution at home.
This research has some general and specific implications. First, it is worth emphasizing that corruption in procurement is highly prevalent around the world. Even under conservative assumptions, rough estimations of total worldwide procurement bribery would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars every year; thus inaction can be costly. The old adage that 'corruption doesn't pay' can be misleading because even if bribery is overall welfare-reducing, for many firms corruption often does 'pay' in terms of their bottom line. For it not to 'pay' the cost-benefit calculus such a firm faces needs to be altered. The growing emphasis on corporate social responsibility should not divert attention from the fact that there is still the 'one' bottom line that rules corporate behavior, namely profit. Thus, infra-marginal increases in costs and/or decreases in benefits from bribing are bound to change the firm's calculus sufficiently for it to cease bribing and compete for contracts through productive efficiency.
At a practical level, this implies that judiciary and procurement system reforms, such as introducing major transparency (online procurement systems, for instance, as in Mexico, Korea and Chile) and competitive bidding, as well as strengthening the audit and investigative institutions, could be effective on the public sector supply side-as would be a free press and solid investigative journalism and civil society oversight on the demand side. The effectiveness of this broad-based good governance approach contrasts with the unclear benefits from voluntary initiatives or associations led by groups of enterprises themselves, where there is little enforcement or penalty, such as signing 'no bribery' pledges or corporate responsibility codes of conduct.
Further, civil society organizations, working closely with the media, could enhance the likelihood of detection and exposure and increase reputational costs. In the case of foreign companies, which may be particularly susceptible to the reputational risks of engaging in bribery, civil society and media initiatives would be warranted in both the host and home countries and through international NGOs such as Transparency International. Additionally, governments and international organizations could publicly disclose a list of companies that have been found to bribe in public procurement, as is done by some institutions like the World Bank.
Finally, this work has potential implications for aid effectiveness by donor institutions. The rather high prevalence of bribery in procurement in many aid-recipient countries suggests that every donor institution needs to face up more effectively to the potential of corruption in many of the projects they fund. Further, the fact that the overall governance environment is a major determinant of such high prevalence of bribery implies that the longstanding efforts by many donor aid institutions to 'ringfence' (or 'insulate' from the otherwise misgoverned environment) aid projects may be futile. Instead, donor institutions would need to pay further attention in working with the country to strengthen governance institutions.
Our research effort is an initial contribution to what we hope will be expanded in the future with additional data availability and access to variables that can directly capture reputational costs. 
